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BUILDING A COMPETITIVE U.S. AUTO INDUSTRY
Senator Max Baucus
Center for National Policy
Washington, D.C.
February 21, 1992
I'm pleased to have the opportunity to spend a few minutes speaking with you today
about America's place in the world. More precisely, about this country's continued struggle
for economic survival.
In these times of trans-Pacific insults, I'm sure you've heard the same critics I have.
"The United States doesn't know how to design a product. We don't know how to
manufacture a product once it's designed. If the United States doesn't rebuild it's industry,
it can't remain a leading country."
Tough words coming from Japan. Actually, they're even tougher than you might think.
Because those words didn't come from the Japanese. They came from Bill Spencer, the
President of Sematech -- the outfit created to sharpen our competitive position on semi-
conductors.
Bill Spencer clearly doesn't sound like a happy man. And we don't sound like a
happy country.
You don't have to look back very far to figure out why. We have been on a wild and
dangerous ride.
The 1970s was a decade of doubt, division, and disgrace. In the 1980s, our most
prominent "manufactured" item was the belief that everything was okay.
Well everything is not okay. For more than a decade, this country's been trapped by
a Reagan-Bush economic policy that can only be called "The Alchemist's Nightmare." Wealth
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has been changed into debt, jobs at home have become jobs abroad, and every American birth
certificate for years to come will have "I.O.U." stamped on it in several foreign languages.
For more than two decades, we have been a nation without a focus where "doing our
own thing" was the fashion -- but not- doing-it-very-well was the flaw.
We became a debtor nation. We didn't care enough about the quality of what we
made to buy it ourselves. In fact, Americans were the first -- and probably the worst -- critics
of American manufacturing quality.
AMERICA'S COMPETITIVE DECLINE
In key American industries ranging from autos to steel to semiconductors, the United
States has experienced serious competitive problems both at home and abroad.
In the 50s and 60s, American-made automobiles, steel, and electronic products set the
standard for the rest of the world. But by early 80s, those standards were set by German cars,
Korean steel, and Japanese electronics products.
American industry struggled first to keep pace and then not to fall too far behind.
It didn't take us long to figure out that the U.S. was slipping further behind in the
world economy. Many of the complaints about lower foreign labor costs and lax foreign
regulations had a basis in fact. But they didn't make American cars run any better and didn't
improve the reception on American television sets. American consumers began to lose faith
in American products. Japanese and German products were identified with quality; American
products were identified with shoddy workmanship.
But instead of improving quality, industries sought protection from imports. For the
most part, the import protection that the government handed out to industries such as textiles,
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steel, machine tools, and autos, only raised the prices paid by consumers and allowed the
executives of uncompetitive industries to line their pockets.
And, when the protection expired, the industries were no more competitive and they
only demanded more protection at consumer expense.
RAYS OF HOPE
Overall, the economic news has not been good in recent years. But there is some
reason for hope. In the steel industry, some highly competitive American mini-mills have
arisen from the ashes of the old steel mills.
In the semiconductor industry, we recently saw Intel take a Japanese product -- "Flash
memory" computer chips -- improve upon it and capture 85 percent of the market.
Even in the auto industry, U.S. companies no longer seem content to bellyache.
Billions of dollars have been invested in new manufacturing techniques and there are signs that
it is paying off. Lists of top cars in each category used to sound like a listing of the leaders
on the Tokyo stock exchange. But now names like the G.M. Saturn, the Ford Taurus, and
the Chrysler Le Baron, are cropping up on the list. Cadillac even won a Baldrige Award
for excellence in 1990.
Realistically, though they are encouraging, a spring crocus here and there does not
mean that we have conquered our competitiveness problems. But the burden of improving
U.S. competitiveness should not fall entirely on industry. The government must also find a
better way to do its job. Why can't the U.S. government provide import relief to U.S.
industries that are experiencing competitive problems in a way that encourages them to become
more competitive, instead of falling further behind?
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THE HARLEY DAVIDSON EXPERIENCE
I think we can. And the experience of Harley Davidson proves import relief can
promote competitiveness and not reward laziness.
Harley's motorcycles had been famous worldwide. The company had learned how to
make a lot of bikes, but by the 70s they had forgotten how. to make them the best. Quality
vanished, followed quickly by the customers.
Harley did a number of things to reverse its fortunes, but two stand out above the
others. First, it sought import protection, and second, it focused on quality control and
employee training.
You know the rest. Harley got import relief in the form of
higher tariffs. It used the breathing room the tariffs provided to overhaul its operation. It
revamped its management, and started building motorcycles people wanted again, motorcycles
people trusted again. And Harley Davidson actually ended up urging the government to end
import protection ahead of schedule.
And the experience with Harley hasn't gone unnoticed. We attempted to spur similar
reinvestment in the steel industry when we extended import protection in 1984. And the 1988
Trade Act moved towards requiring industries to develop a plan for becoming more
competitive in return for import protection.
These experiments haven't always worked perfectly. For example, the steel industry
spent too much money investing in unrelated industries -- essentially playing the market. But
we can learn from our mistakes.
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A PLAN FOR IMPORT RELIEF
We have learned enough to know that we must handle industry requests for import
protection differently than we have in the past. History has demonstrated that such industry
requests will come and that some will be politically impossible to resist. But we can turn
necessity into virtue by requiring competitive improvements in return for -import relief.
And given budget constraints, conditioned import relief is one of the few tools the U.S.
government can use to promote competitiveness.
We must keep in mind that when an industry comes to the government asking for
protection, it is really asking for billions of dollars out of consumers pockets.
For example, though the numbers can be debated, it has been estimated that the Auto
VRA program of the early 1980s cost U.S. consumers more than $5 billion.
If America is going to invest that kind of money in any U.S. industry -- no matter how
large or politically powerful it is -- it has the right to demand a return on its investment.
Shareholders demand a return when they buy stock from GM, the American consumer deserves
the same treatment.
In the future, if a U.S. industry requests import protection, we must demand that the
industry invest in improving its competitiveness in exchange. If the industry is not willing
to make that investment, the request for protection should be denied. It is really just this
simple. The U.S. government must demand a return on its investment -- the quid pro quo for
import relief is increasing competitiveness.
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THE AUTO EXAMPLE
The American industry that is now most actively seeking protection is the auto industry.
Hit by the double whammy of the recession and Japanese competition, Detroit is reeling.
I am well aware of the many arguments against import barriers: they raise consumer
costs, discourage competition, and hinder world trade. But the automakers can make a good
case for import relief.
The auto industry is an important part of our economy. According to recent estimates,
the auto industry is responsible for 4.5% of U.S. GNP and more than 2 million American jobs.
And the impact of the auto industry stretches beyond Detroit. The American auto
industry supports industries ranging from electronics to steel. We all know that Detroit is a
major consumer of U.S. steel. But how many of you knew that the number one customer of
one of our largest high-tech companies -- Motorola -- is Ford Motor Company? Modern autos
use computer chips in displays and controls. In a few years, new cars may have many
computer operated systems.
But, as we all know, the auto industry has been experiencing competitive problems.
The Japanese share of the U.S. auto market has steadily risen since the 1960s. Today, if the
sales to U.S. rental car fleets are excluded, the Big Three hold only about a 60% share of
the U.S. auto market.
Auto sales in the United States went up 11.1 percent in late January. But the Japanese
gained market share at the expense of the Big Three. Chrysler lost $655 million in 1991.
General Motors has been losing an average of $500 million a month in the U.S. Taken
together, the Big Three U.S. auto makers -- General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler -- are virtually
certain to post record losses for 1991.
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Further, since the European Community just concluded an agreement to restrict Japanese
auto imports for the next ten years, more Japanese autos are likely to be diverted to the
American market.
And -- although they have succeeded in selling cars in Europe and around the world -
- the Big Three have not been able to crack the Japanese market in return.
Part of the fault is their own. If the Big Three want to sell cars in Japan, they will
have to work at it and build cars tailored to Japanese consumers. But even when we have
products Japanese consumers want to buy, like the Jeep Cherokee, an array of Japanese non-
tariff barriers has kept U.S. automakers from making the sale.
In short, the playing field is still not level.. And the American auto industry is
certainly not a basket case. On a level playing field, it is beginning to show some real
competitive muscle.
Perhaps, with a few years of import protection, the Big Three could once again set
the standard for the world to meet and save millions of American jobs in the process.
American cars could regain sales in St. Louis and Portland as well as Tokyo and Bonn.
Toward that end, I am today unveiling a plan -- which I intend to introduce as
legislation -- to improve the competitiveness 'of the American auto industry.
The proposal is built around the simple concept of short-term import relief in return
for a commitment to build a more competitive industry and produce better products.
First, my proposal establishes a standstill on Japan's current U.S. sales level. It would
limit Japan's share of the U.S. vehicle market to the current level of imports from Japan,
approximately 2 million units, plus the current level of Japanese transplant production. That
means roughly 3.6 million units annually. Transplant autos with 70 percent or greater local
content won't be counted against the limit.
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These limits would be reviewed every two years and would be in place for no more
than seven years.
But these years are to be a chance to catch up with the competition, and not some
loophole for continued business-as-used-to-be.
The chairman of the largest bank west of the Mississippi recently said the following
in reference to a new "buy American" program for his employees:
"The producers better take advantage by making products at good prices and good
quality. This is not a gimmicky market."
He's right. Good prices, good quality, no gimmicks. Buyers are demanding that now.
And my proposal, in return for import protection, requires that the Big Three make
quality Job One throughout the industry.
I will demand that the auto industry demonstrate continued increases in production
efficiency, product quality, and customer service -- the criteria set by the Commerce
Department for awarding the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award. The emphasis will
be on results -- forcing the Big Three to build better cars.
Every two years, the International Trade Commission will evaluate the auto industry
against these standards. And if quality isn't steadily increasing, the protection will be
terminated.
In order to meet these tough standards and build better cars, the auto industry must
continue to reinvest in their production facilities, worker training, and research and
development. But the focus will be on results, not on micromanaging the auto industry.
The Big Three themselves will make the specific investment decisions.
Further, if the Big Three want temporary import relief, they will have to scale
executive compensation to a level more in line with industrial reality than with major league
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baseball. Auto executives cannot expect to collect obscene salaries while they lay off U.S.
auto workers.
These are realistic measures. They are not mandatory. If the American auto industry
believes it can turn itself around without further import restraints, that's fine. More power to
them. But if import restraints are to be imposed, major continuing improvement is the price.
The auto industry in this country has made substantial progress. But through much of
the 1980s, the auto industry squandered the relief provided by the auto VRA. American
automakers raised prices instead of focusing on gaining market share. And each of the Big
Three played the mergers and acquisitions game. It remains to be seen whether the progress
made in recent years will be lasting or permanent.
Recent polls suggest that the majority of American consumers truly want to buy
American. In light of the improvements made, I encourage consumers to at least try American
before they buy a foreign car.
But next time, regardless of manufacturing origin, they'll buy what's best, whether it's
from the United States or from somewhere else.
We have to take steps right now to persuade the consumer -- here and in Japan -- that
American-made is the best buy.
And if the auto industry wants import relief while it rebuilds and retools, we should
grant it -- provided the Big Three are willing to meet higher standards for quality, efficiency,
and service. I am still open to discussion on specifics, but that must be the outline of the
bargain.
No one should doubt the talent or tenacity of the United States. Thirty years ago, John
Glenn became the first American to orbit the earth. And less than a decade later, it was an
American astronaut, not a Soviet cosmonaut, who took the first walk on the moon. America
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won the technology race.
And we can win the economic race. We can bring the determination we brought to
the space race to the challenge of building a competitive economy.
We don't have to beat our chests or raise our voices. We just have to do the job, and
do it better than we ever have before.
And we have to do it right now.
And if U.S. industries come looking for a free ride at consumers expense, I will stand
in their way. We cannot afford any more free rides for the auto industry, the steel industry,
or anyone else.
From now on, the price for government protection has got to be building a more
competitive industry. Working together, government and industry can build a more
competitive America.
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